Personal Identity †Philosophy Essay

It is well to see oneself as the homogeneous soulfulness we were ten, twenty, or fifty years ago. We can define individuation by means of our physical presence, life experiences, memories, and mental aw beness of self. One can turn up our take to the woodsence as a man-to-man through our existence as a person. But what controls us the equivalent person? In this paper, I will advocate for the undecomposable view of the persistence of individualism that it is unsurmountable to determine what single thing that makes us the same person all over time. I will support my claim with the refutation of the main mazy view claims of the body, creative thinker and mental continuity criterion.Entrenched in the simple view is the idea that in the flesh(predicate) identity, and the persistence of personal identity, cannot be heedful through philosophical discourse or scientific investigation. There ar a number of opposing arguments, known as conglomerate theories of persona l identity. In each of these arguments, the central claim is that either the body, the wiz, or the psychological continuity of an individual determines how they persist as the same person (Garrett, 1998, p 52). To resound them complex is a misnomer for each is far too foreshorten to properly define and explain personal identity. tangled argument 1 Psychological continuity John Locke defines a person as a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places (Locke, 1689, p 1-6). This commonwealthment give notices that, in order to persist as the same person, we must digest a mental consciousness which persists through time. We can assign that a person is psychologically continuous if they have a mental state that is descending(prenominal) from their previous mental states.For example, this theory states that a five-year-old will be the same person when they are a 25-year-old, bec ause their mental state in by and by years is descendent from their earlier years. Counter argument By its precise nature, the idea of psychological continuity is flawed. It is not uncommon for an individuals mental state to be changed so drastically that they could not rattling be considered the same person. Several examples have been made by Waller sufferers of cognitive impairments such as dementia, people who have gone through nerve-racking or traumatic situations, and war eterans that are affected by post-traumatic idiom disorder (Waller, 2011, p 198-210).In any of these cases, it would be difficult to argue that the individual has a continuous mental state more spotless would be to describe them as a snap or put in that, effectively, creates a new person. The only conclusion is that these individuals do not persist, as their psychological states become radically different from their previous psychological states. Complex argument 2 Persistence of the body Another expre ssion of the complex view is the body criterion.Put simply, a person is said to persist if they exist in the same physical body over time. In this case, the previously mentioned dementia or PTSD sufferers would be considered the same people, as their physical body has continued. The theory suggests a brute physical sexual congress between body and identity (Korfmacher, 2006). Without regard for mental state, an individual is considered to have a persistent personal identity as long as their body survives. Counter argument This theory lends itself easily to thought experiments, and they promptly expose well-nigh problems.If individual A receives an organ donation from individual B, can it be said that individual A has taken some of Bs identity? Surely not. It would be absurd to suggest that having the kidney or liver of another person would affect ones persistence as an individual. Similarly, if individual C had their body cloned, it would not make their clone the same person. The re is lots more to personal identity than can be defined by something so comparatively insignificant as the physical body. Complex argument 3 Persistence of the brainThe brain is the functional centre of the human body the place where memories are stored, feelings are felt, and environmental signals are processed. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the brain is so often considered to be the home of personal identity. This theory is a staple of many acquaintance fiction texts as a convention, the cognizant brain in a jar or brain transplant recipient is fairly common. Proponents of this we are our brains theory claim that, so long as the brain persists, so does the person. Counter argumentThis theory seems to refer to consciousness rather than the physicality of the brain, so it is important to make a clarification between the two. Julian Baggini suggests that we should view the alliance between consciousness and identity similarly to the relationship between a musical score an d the paper it is written on (Baggini, 2005, pp. 112-114). In other words, the brain is simply a storage piazza for our memories, thoughts, and self-awareness. Should it not, therefore, be so that an individual could simply persist as a brain in a jar, provided they could be sustained in that state?If the entirety of personal identity is stored in the brain, there must be no need for the rest of the body beyond keeping the brain alive. Such a theory could not possibly be true life experiences and interactions with the world are such an intrinsic part of identity that we could not persist without them. The theory that consciousness plays a significant manipulation in the persistence of personal identity is appealing, but it can not be said that the brain alone could sustain consciousness.ConclusionTo call the simple view of the persistence of personal identity simple is close deceptive deep consideration on the subject quickly turns towards the complex. It is easy to grasp at th e categories of body, brain, and mental state, but it would be wrong to say that the persistence of any of those equates to the persistence of an individual. Personal identity is something so much harder to define, and it is harder still to find definitive measures of its continuation. Personal identity is evasive, and fleeting it is intangible, ever-changing. Its persistence is so much more than can be determined.